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COLORADO V. SuNoco: THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S STAND ON
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR CERCLA COST RECOVERY
ACTIONS
INTRODUCTION
In 1980, the United States Congress responded to a series of na-
tional environmental disasters' by passing the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). 2 Con-
gress wrote the legislation in hopes of protecting human health and the
environment by providing a "comprehensive response and financing
mechanism to abate and control the vast problems associated with aban-
doned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites."3 In 1986, Congress
amended CERCLA with the Superfund Amendments and Reauthoriza-
tion Act ("SARA"), and further facilitated the "prompt clean-up of haz-
ardous waste sites' 4 by enhancing the effectiveness of CERCLA's pri-
mary financing tool, the Superfund.5 SARA broadened the extent of the
Superfund as a financial resource because it allowed for payments into
the fund from producers of chemicals and petroleum products, often in
exchange for CERCLA liability exemptions.6 In essence, the Superfund
provides the government with the capital necessary to immediately re-
spond to toxic releases at dangerous hazardous waste sites, without ini-
tially having to deal with the often intricate and lengthy process of as-
signing liability.7
After the government spends Superfund dollars to facilitate re-
sponse at a hazardous substance release site, it may then concentrate its
efforts on the assignment of liability, using CERCLA's cost-shifting pro-
visions.8 The Superfund Amendments of 1986 ensure that after the gov-
1. See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Gates Rubber Co., 175 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir.
1999) ("Congress enacted CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675, in the wake of the Love Canal disas-
ter .... ).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (2000).
3. H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 1(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125.
4. See generally Brock Elliot Czeschin, United States v. Navistar International Transporta-
tion Corp.: Seventh Circuit Bars Government's CERCLA Claim Based on Violation of the Statute of
Limitations, 10 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 399, 429 (1999). "Congress enacted ... the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) . . . to correct perceived inadequacies in the CERCLA
framework." Id. at 399 n.2.
5. Id. at 429. In January of 2002, Congress again amended CERCLA with the "Brownfields
Amendments." United States v. Domenic Lombardi Realty, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2d 198, 209 (D.R.I.
2003). These amendments provided certain exemptions for CERCLA liability, namely in allowing
property owners or surveyors to re-develop certain CERCLA sites without fear of facing liability.
See Domenic Lombardi Realty, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2d at 209.
6. See Ulvestad v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 818 F. Supp. 292, 293-94 (C.D.Cal. 1993); see also
Consumers Power Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 597 N.w.2d 274, 281 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
7. See Gates Rubber Co., 175 F.3d at 1181.
8. See Morrison Enters. v. McShares, Inc., 302 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2002).
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emnment promptly responds to a release or threat of release of a hazard-
ous substance, it can then "shift the cost of environmental response from
the taxpayers to the parties who benefitted [sic] from the wastes that
caused the harm." 9 Further, CERCLA imposes retroactive, strict, and
joint and several liability upon several classes of potentially responsible
parties ("PRPs"). l0 Such liability may attach to:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility [where the re-
lease occurred],
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous sub-
stance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous sub-
stances were disposed of,
(3) any person who . . . arranged for disposal or treatment ... of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person .... and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities .... 11
Many courts have found that Congress intended the potential liabil-
ity under CERCLA to be quite expansive. 12 Because CERCLA imposes
joint and several liability, a single PRP may be held liable for all costs
relating to the cleanup of the hazardous substance release, regardless of
that party's degree of responsibility. 13 However, Congress did provide
PRPs various forms of equitable relief, permitting PRPs to spread the
response costs among themselves. 14 If found liable, a PRP may invoke
either the contribution provisions of the statute, whereby "[a]ny person
[that is held liable under the statute] may seek contribution from any
other person who is liable or potentially liable,"' 5 or the PRP may choose
to initiate its own cost recovery action against another PRP.16 By allow-
ing PRPs to initiate CERCLA cost recovery actions themselves, Con-
gress provided an avenue through which response costs are spread only
among the responsible parties, sparing taxpayers the burden of financing
the cleanup of hazardous wastes.
17
9. Gates Rubber Co., 175 F.3d at 1181.
10. Morrison Enters., 302 F.3d at 1132-33.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(1)-(4).
12. See Aaron A. Garber, The PRP, the Section 106 Administrative Order, the Contribution
Claim, and CERCLA's Statute of Limitations: A Complete Statutory Analysis, 16 TEMP. ENvTL. L.
& TECH. J. 115, 121 (1997).
13. Id. at 120.
14. See id.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1).
16. Garber, supra note 12, at 120 ("Jurisdictions are split over who may bring section 107
[i.e., 42 U.S.C. § 9607] cost-recovery actions. Since the adoption of SARA, some jurisdictions have
granted section 107 cost-recovery actions only to voluntary or innocent parties; thereby, limiting a
PRP's right to recover clean-up costs to section 113 [i.e., 42 U.S.C. § 9613] contribution claims.").
17. Id. at 118.
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It is clear that under CERLCA, Congress intended for PRPs, not
taxpayers, to bear the costs of all responses to hazardous substance re-
leases into the environment.' 8 To protect PRPs from perpetual liability,
Congress incorporated a statute of limitations into CERCLA, which lim-
its the timeframe during which the government or private individuals
may pursue cost recovery actions.19 CERCLA's statute of limitations is
said to both encourage the "timely clean-up of affected sites and to en-
sure replenishment of the [Super]fund ....
Some courts have found CERCLA's statute of limitations funda-
mentally vague.2' However, where the interpretation of CERCLA's stat-
ute of limitations is at issue in a case, courts traditionally have construed
the statute of limitations in favor of the government.22 Courts have
adopted such a construction to further the underlying structures and poli-
cies Congress intended in passing the law, primarily, the notion that
PRPs, not taxpayers, should bear the costs of hazardous substance
cleanup. 23 Courts have interpreted CERCLA as a "broad remedial stat-
ute, 24 mandating that "those who benefit financially from a commercial
activity internalize the environmental costs of the activity as a cost of
doing business.,,25 Although it appears that reasonable policy concerns
would encourage courts to construe CERCLA's statute of limitations in
favor of governmental cost recovery, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
recently rejected such a construction in Colorado v. Sunoco, Inc.
26
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Sunoco is questionable because of
its departure from the reasoning many courts have adopted in construing
CERCLA's statute of limitations. This comment will first examine
CERCLA's statute of limitations as applied to both removal and remedial
actions. Most courts typically lend deference to administrative bodies in
characterizing such actions, as was done by the Tenth Circuit in Sun-
oco.27 In light of the traditional deference afforded to agency characteri-
zations, one would assume that a court should also defer to the Environ-
mental Protection Agency's ("EPA") application of statutes of limitation
according to its preferred characterizations, such as the "operable units"
characterization at issue in Sunoco.28 This comment will also examine
the Tenth Circuit's deference to the EPA's characterizations of response
actions at the Sunoco site. Next, this comment will contrast that degree of
18. United States v. Manzo, 182 F. Supp. 2d 385, 403 (D.N.J. 2000).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(g)(2)(A), (B).
20. United States v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 152 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 1998).
21. E.g., Kelley v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 17 F.3d 836, 842 (6th Cir. 1994) (apply-
ing presumptions to CERCLA's statute of limitations because of perceived statutory ambiguity).
22. See, e.g., Manzo, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 403.
23. Id.
24. B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 514 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted).
25. B.F. Goodrich, 99 F.3d at 514 (internal quotations omitted).
26. 337 F.3d 1233, 1241-42 (10th Cir. 2003).
27. Sunoco, 337 F.3d at 1243.
28. See id.
2004]
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deference with the court's less deferential stance toward the EPA's ap-
plication of CERCLA's statute of limitations to separate "operable units"
of a CERCLA site. Further, this comment will examine and contrast
other jurisdictions' treatment of the "operable units" issue, and address
the pragmatic reasoning and policy concerns underlying those courts'
decisions. Finally, this comment will evaluate the negative implications
of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Sunoco-for the environment, taxpay-
ers, and responsible parties alike.
I. CERCLA's STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS APPLIED TO SEPARATE
OPERABLE UNITS
A. Background: CERCLA 's Statute of Limitations for Cost Recovery
Actions
For purposes of applying CERCLA's statute of limitations, 42
U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2), Congress divided response activities into two cate-
gories: removal actions and remedial actions.29 A removal action gener-
ally "costs less, takes less time, and is geared to address an immediate
release or threat of release [of a hazardous substance]., 30 Therefore,
CERCLA's statute of limitations requires that the initial cost recovery
suit for a removal action be filed within three years after the completion
of that action.31 A remedial action is typically more comprehensive, im-
plementing a permanent solution to the release or threatened release of
hazardous substances at the site.32 Remedial actions are often signifi-
cantly more costly and time consuming than removal actions, and conse-
quently Congress mandated that a government entity or private party
must initiate the cost recovery suit for a remedial action within six years
"after initiation of physical on-site construction of the remedial action
.... Notably, Congress also structured the statute of limitations in a
flexible manner, anticipating the complexity and long-term nature of site
cleanups, along with the potential for unforeseen future costs commonly
associated with CERCLA response actions. 34 Such flexibility is exhibited
in 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2), which requires that the court hear an initial
cost recovery action prior to issuing a declaratory judgment, allowing the
plaintiff to file subsequent cost-recovery actions to recapture further re-
sponse costs incurred at the site.35 A party must commence a subsequent
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(g)(2)(A), (B).
30. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Gates Rubber Co., 175 F.3d 1177, 1182 (10th Cir. 1999).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)(A).
32. Gates Rubber Co., 175 F.3d at 1182.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)(B). The section goes on to state that where remedial actions begin
within three years of completion of the removal action on the same site, a party may recover the





action to recover additional costs "no later than 3 years after the date of
completion of all response action. 36
B. Degree of Deference Lent to the Environmental Protection Agency in
Determining Appropriate Response to Hazardous Substance Releases
In providing the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") with
two means of responding to the release of hazardous substances at a par-
ticular site, Congress declared that EPA's decision on the matter should
receive a substantial degree of deference from courts. In 42 U.S.C. §
9613(j)(2), Congress set forth the standard it deemed appropriate for
judicial review of EPA's determination of a proper response, in declaring
that "the court shall uphold the President's decision in selecting the re-
sponse action unless the objecting party can demonstrate . .. that the
decision was arbitrary and capricious ....
However, some courts have lent somewhat of a lesser degree of
deference to EPA in both its characterizations of response actions and in
its interpretation of environmental laws.38 Although CERCLA does grant
EPA substantial deference in choosing methods of response, CERCLA
does not directly speak to the appropriate standard that courts should
utilize when reviewing EPA's characterizations of response actions.39 In
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the
United States Supreme Court ruled that where a "statute is silent or am-
biguous with respect to the specific issue," the proper standard of review
is whether "the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction
of the statute. 40 Courts grant such a wide degree of deference only in
cases where "Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to
make rules carrying the force of law," and where the agency's determina-
tion in question "was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.
41
Not all agency actions or decisions may warrant Chevron-type def-
erence.42 However, EPA characterizations of response actions will often
carry at least some weight on judicial review.43 Courts base this lesser
degree of deference on Skidmore v. Swift & Co., where the United States
Supreme Court held that an agency's rulings and opinions are due at least
some weight, being "made in pursuance of official duty, based upon
36. Id. Case law suggests that no statute of limitations applies where a PRP seeks contribution
from another PRP. See Garber, supra note 12, at 122.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 96130)(2).
38. See, e.g., American Wildlands v. Browner, 260 F.3d 1192, 1196-97 (10th Cir. 2001); see
also United States v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 152 F.3d 702, 712 (7th Cir. 1998).
39. Colorado v. Sunoco, Inc., 337 F.3d 1233, 1243 (10th Cir. 2003).
40. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
41. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001). Courts typically refer to this
degree of deference as "Chevron deference." Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226.
42. See Sunoco, 337 F.3d at 1243.
43. Id. (holding that because of EPA's "expertise in selecting and executing removal and
remedial actions," agency characterizations of those actions are due at least some weight).
2004]
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more specialized experience and broader investigations" than what are
likely to arise in a courtroom.44
Courts may either defer to EPA characterizations as carring the
force of law, or consider them with somewhat lesser weight. Either
way, it is clear that in furthering the statutory purposes behind CERCLA,
both Congress and the Supreme Court intended that an EPA characteriza-
tion made in the course of responding to a hazardous substance release,
such as the characterization of a removal versus a remedial action, de-
serves at least some deference by a court reviewing those agency deci-
sions.46
C. The Environmental Protection Agency's Characterization of Operable
Units
The release of hazardous substances into the environment poses a
substantial risk to human health and the environment.47 Governmental
response to such releases should be rapid and thorough.48 It seems appar-
ent that courts should lend at least some deference to the governmental
agency's decisions, expertise, and characterizations necessary to success-
fully carry out that response.49 One frequently disputed characterization
made in relation to CERCLA response actions is EPA's organization of a
Superfund site into 'operable units,' and EPA's separate application of
CERCLA's statutes of limitation thereto.5 °
The EPA will approach a site where a hazardous substance release
threatens to occur or is occurring, evaluate possible cleanup options, and
issue a final Record of Decision ("ROD") to officially memorialize the
response decision. 51 A single Superfund site may contain several types of
waste requiring differing methods of treatment, or the waste may con-
taminate several types of media; therefore, a ROD may set forth multiple
response actions for a single site, as is suggested by 42 U.S.C. §
9621(d).52 Where a site requires separate "phases" of remedial action, the
44. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944). Courts typically refer to this type of
deference as "Skidmore deference." See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co., 175 F.3d at 1181.
45. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139-40.
46. See Sunoco, 337 F.3d at 1243.
47. Gates Rubber Co., 175 F.3d at 118 1(quoting H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. I, at 1 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125).
48. Id. (citing OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., 116 F.3d 1574, 1578 (5th
Cir. 1997)).
49. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139-40.
50. See, e.g., Sunoco, 337 F.3d at 1241; United States v. Manzo, 182 F. Supp. 2d 385, 399
(D.N.J. 2000).
51. Manzo, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 401. However, a ROD is required only in cases where the EPA
places the site on the National Priorities List ("NPL"). United States v. Ambroid Co., 34 F. Supp. 2d
86, 89 (D.Mass. 1999). If the site is not on the NPL, and depending upon the nature of the response
action, the EPA may choose to issue an "Action Memorandum." See Ambroid Co., 34 F. Supp. 2d at
90.
52. Manzo, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 401 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)). Reports accompanying the
SARA legislation suggested that the agency should issue a separate ROD for "'each separate and
650 [Vol. 81:3
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EPA has commonly labeled those phases as "operable units,"53 defined
as:
a discrete action that comprises an incremental step toward compre-
hensively addressing site problems. This discrete portion of a reme-
dial response manages migration, or eliminates or mitigates a release,
threat of a release, or pathway of exposure. The cleanup of a site can
be divided into a number of operable units, depending on the com-
plexity of the problems associated with the site. Operable units may
address geographical portions of a site, specific site problems, or ini-
tial phases of an action, or may consist of any set of actions per-
formed over time or any actions that are concurrent but located in dif-
ferent parts of a site.
54
In facilitating cleanup of a hazardous substance, in encouraging eq-
uitable remedies in assigning liability, and in support of Congress' intent
to create economic disincentives for businesses engaging in activities
that threaten human health and the environment, courts have addressed
and consequently accepted the EPA's characterization of operable units
as an essential tool in the comprehensive remedial design. Courts have
found that when EPA encounters a complex CERCLA site, "it is benefi-
cial to divide response actions into different operable units and RODs
because EPA is therefore able to move quickly to reduce health and envi-
ronmental risks while continuing the process of studying other matters on
the site. 56
Not only does the division of response action into operable units aid
the EPA in cleanup, but operable units can also help in apportioning li-
ability between various PRPs in subsequent cost recovery or contribution
actions.57 At a Superfund site where numerous substances are present and
where several PRPs are potentially liable, it may be true that a single
PRP contributed to the release of a particular substance, or it may have
released that substance in one particular geographic portion of the site.58
When the EPA divides its response actions into operable units, it will do
so according to the perceived ease of dealing with various substances
individually, or in separating response action by geographical area.59
Therefore, the costs accrued in response to a particular operable unit will
distinct phase of a response action ....' Id. at 402 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-962, at 224
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3317).
53. Id. at 402.
54. Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 300.5 (2000)).
55. See, e.g., id.
56. Id. at 403.
57. Interview with Nancy Mangone, Enforcement Attorney, United States EPA Region VIII,
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be more accurately known, and more fairly apportioned among PRPs
based upon their actual liability.
60
In recognizing the important role that operable units play both to the
EPA and to PRPs, some courts have sustained the separate application of
CERCLA's statute of limitations upon each operable unit of a remedia-
tion plan.6' However, in its recent Sunoco decision, the Tenth Circuit
disagreed with the reasoning of these courts, and narrowly construed the
statute of limitations provisions of CERCLA.62
D. Tenth Circuit: Colorado v. Sunoco
1. Facts
The Sunoco case was filed in the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado.6 3 In January 2001, the State of Colorado brought a
cost-recovery action under CERCLA § 107 against a series of defen-
dants, including A.O. Smith Corporation, ASARCO, Inc., Bechtel Cor-
poration, and Sunoco, Inc. 64 The District Court granted the defendant
corporations' ("Sunoco") motion for summary judgment, holding that
Colorado's claims were time-barred by CERCLA's six-year statute of
limitations for remedial actions.65 Colorado appealed the judgment, and
with the United States filing as amicus curiae, the Tenth Circuit heard the
case on August 5, 2003.66
In Sunoco, the State of Colorado sought to recover costs accrued in
cleaning up mine waste and contaminated water that had originated from
the abandoned Summitville mine site in southern Colorado. 67 At the fil-
ing of the suit, cleanup at the Summitville site was ongoing and expected
to continue until early 2006, with anticipated total costs exceeding $200
million.68
The Summitville Mine Site was first operated in the late 1870s and
was most recently operated as a cyanide heap leach facility in the 1980s
and early 1990s. 69 During the mine's historic operations (between 1890
and 1950), its shafts and tunnels often filled with groundwater, requiring
the mine's operators to drill adits (horizontal openings intended to drain
60. Id.
61. Manzo, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 402-03.
62. See Sunoco, 337 F.3d at 1242.
63. See id. at 1235.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 1233.
67. Id. at 1236.
68. Appellant's Reply Brief at 1, Colorado v. Sunoco, Inc., 337 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 2003)
(No. 02-1014).
69. Interim Record of Decision for Water Treatment at 4, Summitville Mine Superfund Site,




water).70 Following abandonment of the mine, highly contaminated,
acidic water seeped from two main locations within the site: the Chan-
dler adit and the Reynolds adit.71
A second source of contamination at the Summitville site was the
heap-leach mining pad.72 Heap-leach mining was a technique employed
by the later-day operators of the mine, which entailed spraying a sodium
cyanide solution over piles of crushed ore in efforts to extract gold.73
After abandonment, snow and rainwater would leach through the piles of
ore, and collect high amounts of residual cyanide and metals.74 Due to a
leaky and generally faulty water treatment system, the water, rich with
cyanide and toxic metals, had accumulated into a million gallon holding
pond on the site.75 Periodically, the mine would experience releases of
the cyanide and metal-rich water from the holding pond.76 These releases
caused numerous operational problems at the site and presented substan-
tial danger to fisheries and ecosystems within the surrounding Alamosa
River Watershed.77
In 1992, EPA, at the request of the State of Colorado, took emer-
gency control of the Summitville site from the bankrupt operator and
initiated a response plan, whereby the primary goal was treatment and
containment of the millions of gallons of contaminated water until EPA
could formulate a more permanent remedial plan. 78 The three actions of
interest to the court in this case were "(1) the plugging of the Chandler
adit; (2) the installation of monitoring wells in the Reynolds and Chan-
dler adits; and (3) the construction of the sludge disposal area., 79 The
first two actions commenced in 1994; the sludge disposal area was con-
structed sometime thereafter, and other long-term remedial actions began
at the site in the spring and summer of 1995.80 Colorado as well as the
United States filed an initial cost-recovery suit in May 1996; however,
that suit did not include the present defendants. 81 Instead, the State filed
the suit against Sunoco in January 2001.82 In the latter suit, the district
70. Sunoco, 337 F.3d at 1236.





76. Colorado v. Sunoco, Inc., Civil Action No. 01-N-0001, at 2-3 (D. Colo. Sep. 14, 2001)
(order and memorandum opinion).
77. Sunoco, 337 F.3d at 1237 n.1.
78. Id. at 1236-37.
79. Id. at 1237-38.
80. Id. Some sources indicate that construction began on the sludge disposal area sometime in
1994, while other sources suggest that it had not begun until April of 1995. ld. at 1238.
81. Id. at 1238.
82. Id.
20041
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83court rejected Colorado's arguments, and held that the governments
had initiated construction of the three "remedial" actions prior to January
of 1995, therefore rendering cost-recovery claims for those actions time-
barred by CERCLA's statute of limitations.84
After entry of the District Court's judgment, Colorado filed a mo-
tion to reconsider, asserting the response action at the Summitville site
could be separated into five operable units, each worthy of its own re-
covery action and thus, its own statute of limitations.85 The district court
rejected this argument on the merits and on grounds of timeliness, stating
that Colorado had sufficient time to brief the issue in its response to Sun-
oco's motion for summary judgment.86
2. Decision
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit overturned the district court's holding
on the grounds that it had not properly deferred to EPA characterizations
made in the course of its response at the Summitville Mine Site, and it
had inaccurately characterized EPA's actions at the site.87 EPA and Colo-
rado had argued before the Tenth Circuit that the three response actions
in question at the Summitville site were "removal" actions and not "re-
medial" actions as the district court had found.88
This distinction had a direct impact upon the timeliness of the pre-
sent claim because according to the district court's classification "the
initiation of those ["remedial"] activities [would have] triggered the run-
ning of the [six year] statute of limitations under § 9613(g)(2)(B)," ren-
dering the present cost recovery actions untimely. 89 However, if the ac-
tions at the site were deemed "removal" actions, as the agencies con-
tended, the cost recovery claim would have been timely assuming sched-
uled "remedial" actions commenced as planned.90 Under § 9613(g)(2)(b),
when a subsequent "remedial" action commences within three years of a
prior "removal" action, the statute of limitations for cost recovery on the
second-stage "remedial" actions is extended.91 The EPA was to com-
mence construction of remedial actions at the Summitville site in the
summer of 2004.92 Therefore, when the EPA commences its planned
"remedial" action at the Summitville site in the Summer of 2004, this
action would fall within three years of the completion of the "removal"
83. Id. "Colorado asserted there were genuine issues of material fact concerning whether
activities undertaken at the Site constituted removal or remedial actions and when physical on-site
construction of a remedial action began at the Site." Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1238-39.
87. Id. at 1243.
88. See id. at 1245.
89. Id. at 1243.
90. Id. at 1238.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)(B).
92. Mangone interview, supra note 57.
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action at the site, and toll the statute of limitations for cost-recovery for
another six years after the initiation of on-site construction of EPA's
planned "remedial" action, according to 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)(B).93 if
Colorado could label the plugging of adits, the installation of monitoring
wells, and construction of the sludge-disposal area as "removal" actions
(and label the planned response action as "remedial"), it would then toll
CERCLA's statute of limitations for six additional years, thus rendering
the present cost-recovery action timely.94
The Tenth Circuit found that EPA's characterization of the three ac-
tions at the Summitville site were not worthy of Chevron-type deference,
because it found "no indication that Congress intended for the EPA 'to
speak with the force of law' in characterizing response actions for pur-
poses of the application of CERCLA' s statutes of limitation."
95 However,
the Tenth Circuit did find the district court had erred in that such deter-
minations by EPA were made in continuance of a congressionally as-
signed duty, and were worthy of Skidmore-type deference, which carries
a weight on review not acknowledged by the district court.
96 The Tenth
Circuit evaluated the plugging of the Chandler and Reynolds adits and
the installation of the adit monitoring wells, concluding that those actions
by the EPA constituted removal actions and not remedial actions as the
district court had found.97 Further, the Tenth Circuit found that genuine
issues of material fact existed as to when the sludge disposal area was
constructed.98 Such a finding rendered a "removal" versus "remedial"
determination irrelevant for this activity, and once again, the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that the district court erred in classifying that action as "reme-
dial." 99
A key, albeit collateral, argument made by Colorado in the case as-
serted that "cost recovery statutes of limitation in CERCLA were in-
tended by Congress to apply separately to each individual removal and/or
remedial action."' ° Colorado suggested several policy considerations to
the Tenth Circuit that would underlie such a reading of the statute.1
01 One
of the most compelling arguments suggested by Colorado was its con-
cern over the risk of mismanagement of government resources.
02 Colo-
rado pointed out that in highly complex response actions, the cleanup of
hazardous substances should be the primary focus of government re-
sources, and therefore, the court should allow separable response actions
93. See Sunoco, 337 F.3d at 1241-42.
94. Id. at 1237; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(g)(2)(A), (B).
95. Sunoco, 337 F.3d at 1243 (quoting Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 229).
96. See id. (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).
97. See id. at 1243-44 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)).
98. Id. at 1245.
99. Id. at 1245-46.
100. Id. at 1240.
101. Id. at 1240-41.
102. Id.
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so that the government would be free from prematurely undergoing ex-
tensive investigations and the filing of speculative recovery actions
against every PRP imaginable at an early juncture in the response pe-
riod. 103 Furthermore, Colorado suggested that separating response actions
into operable units "encourages at least partial government recovery of
its cleanup costs from responsible parties, even if early time periods for
recovery expire. ' 4
Given the admonishment to the State that it did not raise the issue
below, and having conceded that the issue of operable units may not
have properly been before it, the Tenth Circuit chose to evaluate the is-
sue nonetheless. °5 After acknowledging Colorado's policy arguments in
favor of applying separate statutes of limitations to operable units, the
court proceeded to a highly textual analysis of 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2),
finding that Congress's use of the articles "a" and "the" in the modifica-
tion of the phrases "removal action" and "remedial action" obviated a
congressional intention to render those actions whole and inseparable.1°6
The court further affirmed this conclusion with an argument in equity,
noting that 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)(A), (B) allows for the filing of subse-
quent actions to recover further costs, so long as the initial action is filed
within the statutory period. 0 7 The Tenth Circuit, following this analysis,
barred the application of CERCLA's statutes of limitation to separate
operable units within a Superfund site.10 8 Although the court's decision
in regard to operable units may prove questionable, the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Sunoco does leave potential for at least partial governmental
cost recovery.109 A favorable outcome remains possible if on remand
Colorado can prove the actions were indeed removal actions, which were
then followed by subsequent remedial actions within at least three years,
tolling the statute of limitations according to 42 U.S.C. §
9613(g)(2)(B) 1 °
103. See id.
104. Id. at 1241.
105. See id.
106. Id.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(g)(2)(A), (B).
107. Sunoco, 337 F.3d at 1241-42. However, this conclusion fails to address the very point that
Colorado was asserting. That is, investigations following complex CERCLA response actions may
uncover additional PRPs not contemplated at the initiation of the suit, or within the statutory time
period. However, the court does point out that the defendants in this particular case were known at
the filing of the initial action and the State simply failed to include those parties in the initial action.
Id. at 1242 n.2.
108. Id. at 1240.




E. Differing Analyses of the Operable Units Argument
1. United States v. Manzo" 1
a. Facts
The case of United States v. Manzo was a CERCLA cost-recovery
action heard before the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey. 12 The defendants in that case acquired several lots of land
that their predecessors had used as a landfill and as disposal areas for
"waste oil, used filter clay, and [chemical] sludge." ' 13 After acquiring the
land, the defendant leveled waste lagoons, spread waste over portions of
the land parcels, mixed the waste with sand and gravel, and used some of
this product to build a road through the land. 14 In 1979, EPA and the
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection ("NJDEP") (collec-
tively "the Agencies"), discovered the presence of several hazardous
substances at the site, 15 and entered into a cooperative agreement to use
Superfund dollars for a response action."
16
The Agencies initiated the response by dividing the remedial action
into three operable units, each with a separate ROD." 7 At the time of the
Agencies' filing of this suit, EPA had expended over $8 million in re-
sponse costs at the Manzo's property, with additional costs expected in
the future to undertake further response action."18
b. Decision
The court in Manzo first granted the United States' partial motion
for summary judgment on grounds of liability for the response costs.
119
Next, the court addressed the Manzos' affirmative defense that the
United States' claims were barred by CERCLA's statute of limitations.
120
The court acknowledged that little case law existed to guide it in apply-
ing "the statute of limitations provisions for cost recovery actions under
CERCLA in the context of multiple RODS and operable units."' 2 ' How-
ever, the court found that "[g]iven the prominent role of the concept of
111. 182 F. Supp. 2d 385 (D.N.J. 2000).
112. Manzo, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 388.
113. Id. at 389. The defendants also used portions of the land as a landfill until 1969, when a
zoning injunction banned such a use. Id.
114. Id. at 390.
115. Id. At the Manzo's property, the EPA and NJDEP discovered various contaminants,
including "polychlorinated bi-phenyls ("PCBs"), lead, methylene chloride, trichloroethylene, chloro-
form, and benzene .. " id.
116. Id. at 391.
117. Id. at 391-92. The operable units were designated OU1, OU2, and OU3, each with a
corresponding ROD, designated as RODI, ROD2, and ROD3. Id.
118. Id. at 393. The $8 million figure included only the costs incurred through OU2 and OU3
response actions. Id.
119. Id. at 396.
120. Id. at 399.
121. Id.
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operable units in the administrative framework governing the actual im-
plementation of CERCLA, the Court cannot conclude that it is irrelevant
for purposes of the statute of limitations whether EPA divided its task
into different operable units."'' 22 Therefore, the court addressed the issue
finding guidance in reasonable judicial presumptions, EPA's administra-
tive framework, and policy considerations.
1 23
The court in Manzo adhered to the general notion that in aims of at
least partial government recovery of response costs, statutes of limitation
should be construed liberally in the United States' favor.124 The court
recognized that the designation of operable units as part of EPA's re-
sponse plan was vital to the effective cleanup of the site, and at least de-
served some degree of deference.1 25 In light of the policy concerns and
practical advantages126 of recognizing separate operable units and stat-
utes of limitations, the court concluded that, "the statute of limitations
does not bar compensation for [subsequent] operable units qualifying
under the limitation even if the plaintiff is barred from seeking compen-
sation for earlier operable units.' 27 The court therefore denied Manzo's
affirmative defense to bar cost recovery for OU2 and OU3, while the
United States acknowledged that the statute of limitations had already
barred cost recovery for OU1.1
28
2. United States v. Azko Nobel Coatings, Inc. 1
29
United States v. Azko Nobel Coatings, Inc. was a cost recovery ac-
tion against owners of a landfill in Lapeer County, Michigan. 3° Over the
course of response activities on the site, EPA had issued two RODs, out-
lining two separate operable units within the response action. 131 In the
cost recovery action, the defendants moved for summary judgment on
grounds of CERCLA's statute of limitations. 32 However, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, without exten-
sive analysis of the issue, concluded that in following with United States
Supreme Court precedent, statutes of limitation should be strictly con-
strued "in favor of the Government where application of them might
122. Id. at 402.
123. Id. at 399.
124. Id. at 401.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 402-03 ("The United States asserts that, because of the complexity of Superfund
sites, it is beneficial to divide response actions into different operable units and RODs because EPA
is therefore able to move quickly to reduce health and environmental risks while continuing the
process of studying other matters on the site.").
127. Id. at 402.
128. Id. at 403.
129. 990 F. Supp. 897 (E.D.Mich. 1998).
130. Azko, 990 F. Supp. at 899.
131. Id. at 902-03.
132. Id. at 900. EPA estimated at one point in the feasibility study that the response costs for
OU1 alone would exceed $20 million. Id. at 902.
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otherwise bar its rights.' 3 3 Therefore, the Azko court separately applied
CERCLA' s statutes of limitation to the two operable units at the site, and
further concluded that each response action fell within the allowable
statutory period, thus dismissing the defendant's motion for summary
judgment.1
34
3. United States v. Ambroid Co. 135
In United States v. Ambroid Co., the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts found that CERCLA's statute of limitations
barred an EPA cost-recovery action on grounds that the response action
must be divided into separable units. 136 The court noted that most courts
have interpreted "removal action" broadly so as to further the "essential
purposes of CERCLA [which entails] cleaning up hazardous waste and
doing so at the expense of those who created it."'13 7 Here, the United
States tried to merge several phases of removal actions into one action,
with hopes of tolling the statute of limitations upon the completion of the
entire removal action. 38 However, the court begrudgingly held that con-
trary to the acknowledged underpinnings of CERCLA, the "broadest
reasonable statutory interpretation ... cannot save this case from its fate
of partial summary judgment."'' 39 Interestingly, the court did not hesitate
to separate ongoing response into distinct removal actions, and applied
the statute of limitations to bar recovery for costs spent on the first "divi-
sion. '14° The court divided the response action regardless of the fact that
EPA had issued no official documentation (such as a ROD for a remedial
action, or for removal actions, an Action Memorandum) for any removal
actions undertaken at the site.' 4 ' Such an unrestrained action suggests
that the court in Ambroid Co. felt unhindered from freely separating mul-
tiple response actions within a site, and applying a separate statute of
limitations to each.
II. ANALYSIS
It is apparent from the preceding cases that congressional intent,
policy considerations, and practical concerns all have contributed to a
broad statutory interpretation of CERCLA's statute of limitations.
Courts' interpretation of CERCLA's statute of limitations has repeatedly
allowed for governmental recapture of response costs in cases where the
133. Id. at 904; E.L. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456 (1924)).
134. Azko, 990 F. Supp. at 903.
135. 34 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D.Mass. 1999).
136. See Ambroid, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 91.
137. Id. at 87 (citing Kelley v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 17 F.3d 836, 843 (6th Cir.
1994)).
138. See id.
139. Id. at 90.
140. See id. at 89-90.
141. See id. RODs were not required because the site was not listed on the National Priorities
List. Id. at 89.
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PRP attempts to escape financial responsibility for its actions. 42 In addi-
tion, courts have generally deferred to EPA expertise in responding to
releases at CERCLA sites, and as argued in this comment, they should
continue to do so by giving EPA significant deference in characterizing
response actions as removal or remedial, and by allowing EPA to apply
separate statutes of limitations to operable units at a site.143 Such defer-
ence allows for an orderly and phased approach to site cleanup without
requiring the Agency to exhaust resources on liability investigations and
legal proceedings at the expense of human health and the environment.
In the Sunoco decision, the Tenth Circuit rejected such an ap-
proach. 144 For the most part, the court sided with opponents to an expan-
sive reading of CERCLA's statute of limitations who based their ration-
ale upon a perceived congressional "intention that the government bring
CERCLA suits in a prompt and timely manner,"' 45 and upon a fear of
unbridled and unlimited governmental recovery suits, potentially extend-
ing PRP liability indefinitely. 146 The opponents to multiple statutes of
limitations argue that CERCLA's retroactivity may hold PRPs liable for
actions taken decades in the past, and if left unbridled, liberally applied
statutes of limitations may hold PRPs liable for decades into the future. 147
However, this concern merely amounts to a balancing of public inter-
est.148 Courts that have considered this balancing test have found that the
"promotion of. . . [CERCLA's] goals outweighs the ... argument that
[broad] construction would permit the United States to extend the period
of liability indefinitely ....
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals voiced its objection to a
broad reading of CERCLA's statute of limitations in United States v.
Navistar International Transportation Corporation. °50 The dispute in
Navistar, like in Sunoco, centered on whether the cost recovery actions
filed by the United States were time-barred by CERCLA's statute of
limitations. 15 However, the court in Navistar focused its analysis upon
whether the action filed constituted an "initial" cost recovery action, or a
"subsequent" cost recovery action.152 In Navistar, the Seventh Circuit
rejected the United States' arguments that it should construe statutes of
142. See generally Czeschin, supra note 4, at 402.
143. E.g., United States v. Manzo, 182 F. Supp. 2d 385, 401 (D.N.J. 2000).
144. Colorado v. Sunoco, Inc., 337 F.3d 1233, 1235 (10th Cir. 2003).
145. Czeschin, supra note 4, at 419.
146. See Garber, supra note 12, at 116.
147. See generally Czeschin, supra note 4, at 421 (construing United States v. Navistar Int'l
Transp. Corp., 152 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 1998)).
148. Czeschin, supra note 4, at 400.
149. Manzo, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 403.
150. 152 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 1998).
151. Navistar, 152 F.3d at 705-06.
152. Id. at 706. In Navistar, if the court chose to label the suit before it a "subsequent action," it
would have withstood the statute of limitations challenge. Id. The court instead labeled the action an
"initial" one, and consequently barred the suit because the cost-recovery action was for a remedial
action and had not commenced within six years of the initiation of on-site construction. Id.
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limitations in the government's favor, and instead strictly interpreted
CERCLA's statute of limitations as congressional recognition of a "need
for filing of cost recovery actions in a timely fashion, to assure that evi-
dence concerning liability and response costs is fresh ... The court
in Navistar also asserted that "in order to achieve timely clean-up of af-
fected sites and to ensure replenishment of the fund, cost recovery ac-
tions must commence in a timely fashion."'
154
The reasoning proffered by the court in Navistar, and implicitly fol-
lowed by the Tenth Circuit in Sunoco, seems to accomplish little but to
frustrate CERCLA cost-recovery actions. It appears ironic that in
claimed efforts of ensuring replenishment of the fund, these courts did
little but strengthen PRP defenses against the government in cost-
recovery actions. These arguments also have the effect of placing gov-
ernment agencies and PRPs at risk of filing haphazard cost recovery suits
in situations where evidence may be incomplete or undiscovered. Fur-
ther, the approach taken by the Navistar and Sunoco courts may lead to
rushed liability assignments, and may therefore bar cost-recovery claims
against additional PRPs that government agencies have not yet been able
to investigate or identify.
To refute the strict judicial interpretation of CERCLA's statute of
limitations, opponents of the Navistar court's decision have submitted
that "the negligence of public officers, who fail to act within the statutory
period, should not prejudice the public interest the statute seeks to pro-
tect."' 55 CERCLA was enacted primarily to protect human health and the
environment, and secondly to ensure that the responsible parties, not the
general public, are held financially accountable for cleaning up the pollu-
tion they caused. 156 In safeguarding these two concerns, Congress con-
templated that several response actions may occur at a single site and
thus intended courts to treat those response actions separately when chal-
lenged. 157 Such intent is apparent in the legislative history surrounding
the enactment of CERCLA's statutes of limitation, in that Congress
found the structure of CERCLA's statute of limitations "consistent with
the overall structure of CERCLA, which contemplates that the President
may bring a series of claims for response costs ... with regard to a par-
ticular site . . . ., Congress intended for courts to apply CERCLA's
statutes of limitation separately to operable units because such applica-
tion is consistent with typical deference lent to EPA characterizations
made in the fulfillment of congressionally-assigned duties. 59 In addition,
153. Id. at 708 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 138 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3043).
154. id. at 707.
155. Czeschin, supra note 4, at 410.
156. Garber, supra note 12, at 118.
157. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-962, at 221 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3314.
158. H.R. REP. No. 99-962, at 223 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3316.
159. See generally Manzo, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 402.
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such application encourages expeditious cleanup of hazardous sub-
stances, and it rightly confers financial obligations for cleanup upon re-
sponsible parties.,60
Undoubtedly, Colorado could have avoided the unfortunate decision
of the Tenth Circuit in Sunoco had it filed the Sunoco action with the
initial complaint in 1996, or in some intermediate time thereafter. As
mentioned previously, Colorado knew of the current defendants at the
filing of the initial action, and therefore if the State had joined Sunoco at
that time it could have ensured at least partial recovery of costs accrued
at the Summitville Mine Site. Moreover, if the State had properly set
forth the operable units argument in its motion to deny summary judg-
ment, the argument may have fared better with the Tenth Circuit on ap-
peal. As it stood, the State set forth the operable units argument on a mo-
tion to reconsider and the Tenth Circuit proceeded to address the issue in
its decision. If the issue was fully briefed and considered on its merits,
the Tenth Circuit may have concluded differently, possibly finding per-
suasion from other jurisdictions' treatment of the operable units issue. As
it stands, the decision in Sunoco may prove damaging for future cost-
recovery claims arising from separate operable units of a response action.
The Tenth Circuit, by finding the district court's determinations of
response actions inadequate, lent typical Skidmore-type deference to
EPA characterizations of removal versus remedial actions, and remanded
the case for further proceedings. However, when considering EPA's
determinations of CERCLA's statutes of limitation as applied to separate
operable units, the Tenth Circuit found no need to extend Chevron-type
deference or even Skidmore-type deference. In effect, the Tenth Circuit
honored government agency decision-making in technical characteriza-
tions, but undercut the agencies as soon the time came to enforce those
determinations in the manner that the agencies saw fit.
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit decision in Sunoco will have an uncertain impact
on future cases. In supposedly issuing a "wake-up call" to state and fed-
eral agencies to file timely and prompt cost-recovery actions, the Tenth
Circuit may have overstepped its aims and in so doing, damaged future
cost-recovery claims. The Tenth Circuit provided PRPs with a stronger
affirmative defense than what Congress likely intended, and implicitly
freed other potential PRPs from liability by mandating rushed or possibly
incomplete agency investigations. On a different note, the decision may
also harm PRPs in that the operable unit determination is advantageous
to PRPs in their own cost-recovery or contribution actions, and the Sun-
oco decision impairs the enforceability of that characterization.
160. Czeschin, supra note 4, at 399-400.
161. Sunoco, 337 F.3d at 1243.
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In the future, it is certain that legitimate CERCLA cost recovery ac-
tions will require an expansive reading of CERCLA's statute of limita-
tions to ensure that all PRPs are discovered, and to guarantee that suffi-
cient facts are known so that the agencies can competently prosecute
them. Because of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Sunoco, government
agencies may now have to divert resources away from site cleanup ac-
tions, and toward evidence collection and legal actions at early stages of
the response. This decision circumvents Congress' intent to protect hu-
man health and the environment from hazardous substances at the ex-
pense of those profiting from the endangerment, and rewards them by
allowing them to benefit from the fruits of their misfeasance. In so doing,
the decision leaves the American public with the inherent dangers of
hazardous substances while also requiring them to foot the bill for the
cleanup.
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